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Daniela Hill
In this commentary, the future of artificial minds as it is presented by the target
article will be reconstructed. I shall suggest two readings of Eliasmith’s claims:
one regards them as a thought experiment, the other as a formal argument. While
the latter reading is at odds with Eliasmith’s own remarks throughout the paper, it
is nonetheless useful because it helps to reveal the implicit background assump-
tions underlying his reasoning. For this reason, I begin by “virtually reconstruct-
ing” his claims as an argument—that is, by formalizing his implicit premises and
conclusion. This leads to my second claim, namely that more than technological
equipment and biologically inspired hardware will be needed to build artificial
minds. I then raise the question of whether we will produce minds at all, or rather
functionally differentiated, fragmented derivates which might turn out not to be
notably relevant for philosophy (e.g., from an ethical perspective). As a potential
alternative to artificial minds, I present the notion of postbiotic systems. These
two scenarios call for adjustments of ethical theories, as well as some caution in
the development of already-existing artificial systems.
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1 Introduction
This commentary has two main aims: First, it
aims to reconstruct the major important predic-
tions and claims Eliasmith presents in his target
article as well as his reasons for endorsing them.
Second,  it  plays  its  own  version  of  “future
games”—the “argumentation game”—by taking
some suggestions presented by Eliasmith max-
imally seriously and then highlighting problems
that might arise as a consequence. Of course,
these consequences are of a hypothetical nature.
Still,  they  are  theoretically  relevant  for  the
question of what will be needed to build full-
fledged artificial cognitive agents.
Chris Eliasmith discusses recent technolo-
gical, theoretical, and empirical progress in re-
search  on  Artificial  Intelligence  and  robotics.
His position is that current theories on cogni-
tion, along with highly sophisticated technology
and the necessary financial support, will lead to
the  construction  of  sophisticated-minded  ma-
chines  within  the  coming  five  decades  (Elia-
smith this collection, p. 2). And also vice versa:
artificial minds will inform theories on biological
cognition  as  well.  Since  these  artificial  agents
are likely to transcend humans’ cognitive per-
formance,  theoretical  (i.e.,  philosophical  and
ethical) as well as pragmatic (e.g., legal and cul-
tural  laws etc.)  consequences have to be con-
sidered  throughout  the  process  of  developing
and constructing such machines.
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The ideas Eliasmith presents are derived
from developments  in  three  areas:  technology,
theory, and funding; and I will demonstrate the
background  assumptions  underlying  these.  In
this way, I want to demonstrate that if we read
Eliasmith  as  defending  a  formal  argument
(rather than a thought experiment), this argu-
ment has the form of a  petitio principii. To il-
lustrate this very clearly, a formal reconstruc-
tion of the (not explicitly endorsed, but impli-
citly assumed) arguments will be conducted. I
then argue that even though they are construc-
ted as arguments,  and Eliasmith’s claims fail,
his  suggestions provide an insightful  contribu-
tion to the philosophical debate on artificial sys-
tems and the near future of related research. I
further want to stress that we should perhaps
confine ourselves  to talking about less  radical
alternatives that do not necessarily include the
mindedness of artificial agents, but have some
element of biological cognition (architecture or
software)  in  them.  A  number  of  subordinate
questions have to be looked at in order to arrive
at a point where a justified statement about the
possibility of phenomenologically convincing ar-
tificial minds can be made. These considerations
include more possibilities than simply the dicho-
tomy of human-like vs. artificial. This is due to
our  having to think about possibilities that lie
between or beyond these two extremes, such as
fragmented minds and postbiotic systems, since
they might soon emerge in the real world. The
way in which these will  be relevant to philo-
sophy will be largely a question of their psycho-
logical make-up—most notably, their ability to
suffer.
To start with, the following two sections
will present some relevant aspects of the posi-
tion expressed in the target article.  They will
summarize, and highlight some of the article’s
many informative and noteworthy suggestions. I
shall  also  bring  in  some  additional  thoughts
that  I  consider  important.  Afterwards,  I  will
play a kind of future game of my own: I take
Eliasmith’s predictions very seriously and point
at some of the problems that might arise if we
were to take his suggestions as arguments. To
be  fair,  Eliasmith himself  says  that  what  he
presents are “likely wrong” predictions (this col-
lection, p. 3). So on a more charitable reading,
his claims are not intended to be arguments at
all.  Yet the attempt to reconstruct them as a
formal argument has the advantage of showing
that his claims are based on a reasoning that is
itself problematic.
2 Are artificial minds just around the 
corner?
Eliasmith’s  perspective  on  the  architecture  of
minds is a functionalist one (this collection, p.
2, p. 6, pp. 6–7, pp. 9–11, p. 13). The thread
running through his paper is his interest in “un-
derstanding how the brain functions” and real-
izing “detailed functional models of the brain”
(ibid., p. 9). The basic idea is that if we con-
struct  artificial  minds  and  endow  them  with
certain functions (such as natural language and
human-like perceptual abilities), we can exam-
ine empirically, in a process comparable to re-
verse engineering, what it is that constitutes so-
called  mindedness  (ibid.,  p.  11).  But  in  their
striving to unearth the nature of mindedness, it
is not the task of artificial intelligence research
or  biology  to  deliver  comprehensive  and  full-
fledged theories on biological cognition in gen-
eral and human cognition in particular. Rather,
a  very  interesting  reciprocal  relationship
between the  two parties,  in  which  one  learns
from the other, is what will propel forward our
understanding  of  biological  cognitive  systems.
In the following I give an overview of the most
relevant points that are presented in the target
article. They will be divided up into the original
sections (technical, theoretical, and empirical). 
First, in the technical area and according
to  Eliasmith,  we  are  fairly  far  advanced—al-
though there are certain hindrances to success-
fully implementing theories on this technology.
The main obstacle is the size of artificial neur-
onal  systems  and,  connected  to  that,  their
power consumption. Even though neuromorphic
chips are being improved steadily, the number
of neurons that can be reproduced artificially is
still much lower than the number of neurons a
human brain has.  Thus,  the processing of  in-
formation is significantly slower than in natural
cognitive systems (Eliasmith this collection, p.
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14). Consequently, what can be realized in the
field is still  far from the complexity displayed
by  natural,  biological  cognition.  However,  as
Eliasmith argues, since we are already in posses-
sion  of  the  theoretical  groundwork,  the  main
barrier to overcome are technological advances
(ibid., p. 9). Throughout the paper, Eliasmith
informs the reader that in case we had the tech-
nologies needed, artificial minds would immedi-
ately be created (ibid., e.g., p. 7, p. 9, p. 11).
However, where Eliasmith emphasizes technolo-
gical barriers, I would like to point out that the-
oretical obstacles exist as well. These mainly re-
volve around the fact that a system of ethics
has to be created before we encounter artificial
agents.  Eliasmith  also  comments  on  the  con-
sequences for philosophy, arguing that some ma-
jor positions in the philosophy of mind, such as
functionalism,  will  receive  more  empirical
grounding (ibid., p. 11). 
It seems as if the tacit understanding that
Eliasmith has of the function of artificial minds
is that they serve as shared research objects of
biology and artificial  research science in order
to gain a better understanding of biological cog-
nition (this collection, p. 9). That is of course
only true if indeed the functional architecture of
the  artificial  agent  produces  convincing  beha-
vior, similar to that of biological cognitive sys-
tems (humans and animals alike). To illustrate
possible  problems,  one  can  think  of  the  fact
that in research, we learn from animal experi-
ments, even though these animals are quite dif-
ferent from us in many ways. They are,  how-
ever, similar or at least comparable in one epi-
stemically relevant and specific aspect, i.e., the
one that is to be examined, for example in cer-
tain aspects of metabolism used to test whether
a  new  drug  causes  liver  failure  in  humans
(Shanks et al. 2009, p. 5). It is the same with
artificial agents: they are similar to us in their
behavior and thus a worthwhile research object.
As  such,  we  could  formulate  the  underlying
reasoning as a variant of analytical behaviorism.
Analytical  behaviorists  suppose  that  intrinsic
states of a system are mirrored in certain kinds
of  behavior.  Two  systems  displaying  identical
behavior on the outside can be investigated in
order to detect whether they do so on the inside
as  well  (Graham 2010).  This  means  that  we
could gain insight on the origin of mental states
from a functionally isomorphic system, i.e., an
artificially constructed system that is identical
in organization and behavior to the natural sys-
tem copied.
Last, since it seems that it will be possible
in  the  future,  given  the  required  hardware,  to
design artificial agents according to our needs, it
does not appear far-fetched to assume that the
quality of human life might consequently be im-
proved  to  a  great  extent  (Eliasmith this
collection, p. 11). This requires, however, that we
make up our own minds about how to interact
with such agents, which rights to grant and which
to deny them. And also the opposite case may
not be disregarded: it is imaginable that the arti-
ficial agents will at some point turn the tables
and be the ones to decide on our rights (cf. Met-
zinger 2012). In highlighting aspects from differ-
ent areas to be considered, Eliasmith reminds us
of the possibilities that lie ahead of us, but also of
the challenges that might show up and have to be
faced. I want to suggest that we also take into
consideration alternative outcomes that are not
minds in the biological sense, but rather derivates
of minds. I will therefore put the notion of postbi-
otic systems into play as a way of escaping the di-
chotomy “human-like” vs. “artificial” (Metzinger
2013). The philosophical point here is that the
conceptual distinction between “natural” and “ar-
tificial” may well turn out to be non-exhaustive
and non-exclusive: there might well, as Metzinger
points out, be future systems that are neither ar-
tificial nor biological. By no means do I intend to
argue against the use of scientific models, since
they are what good research needs. Rather, I wish
to draw attention to the possible emergence of in-
termediate  systems,  rather  than  only  the  ex-
tremes (i.e., human-like vs. artificial agents), or
classes of systems that go beyond our traditional
distinctions,  but  which  nevertheless  count  as
“minded”.  As  mentioned  above,  this  is  due  to
these  intermediate  or  postbiotic  systems  being
possible  much  earlier—probably  preceding  full-
blown minded agents.
I will end this section by drawing attention
to some of the author’s thoughts on the crucial
elements of artificially-minded systems. According
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to  Eliasmith,  three  types  of  skills  are  vital  in
building  artificial  minds:  cognitive,  perceptual,
and motor skills have to be combined to create a
certain behavior  of  the minded artificial  agent.
This behavior will then serve as the basis for us
humans to judge whether we perceive the artifi-
cial agent as “convincing” or not (Eliasmith this
collection, p. 9). Unfortunately, no closer specific-
ation of what it is to be “convincing” is given in
the target article. No theoretical demarcation cri-
terion is offered. What we can say with great cer-
tainty, however, is that in the end our subjective
perception of the artificial agents will be the decis-
ive criterion. One could speculate on whether it is
merely an impression, or even an illusion, that
leads  us  to  concluding  that  we  are  facing  a
minded agent. According to Eliasmith, any sys-
tem that produces a robust social hallucination in
human observers will count as possessing a mind.
3 Playing the “argumentation game”
In the following I will play the “argumentation
game” and for a moment assume that what Eli-
asmith presents us with actually is argumenta-
tion. The goal of  this section is not to claim
that Eliasmith really  argues for the emergence
of artificial minds in the classical way. Rather, I
wish to highlight that possibly more than tech-
nological  equipment  and  biologically  inspired
hardware need to be taken into account before
research can present us with a mind, as outlined
by Eliasmith. If we deconstruct his line of reas-
oning and virtually formalize the argument, we
don’t find valid argumentation but rather a set
of highly educated—and certainly informative—
claims about the future, which doubtlessly help
us prepare for a future not too far ahead of us. I
will  utilize  the  terms “argumentation”,  “argu-
ment”, “premise”, and “conclusion” in the fol-
lowing,  but  it  should  always  be  remembered
that these terms are only “virtually” or hypo-
thetically. So let us see how Eliasmith proceeds:
If we play the argumentation game, a first
result  is  that  Eliasmith’s  virtual  argument  be-
comes problematic at the moment he starts elab-
orating  on  theoretical  developments  that  have
been made and that will propel forward the de-
velopment of “brain-like models” (this collection,
p.  6).  From  the  perspective  of  an  incautious
reader,  the  entire  section  “Theoretical  develop-
ments” could be seen as resulting in a claim that
can be traced back to a  petitio principii.  This
means that the conclusion drawn at the end of
the argumentative line is identical with at least
one of the implicit premises. The implicit argu-
mentation is made up of three relevant parts and
unfolds as follows: first, building brain-like models
is not only a matter of the available technological
equipment (ibid., first paragraph; cf. premise  1).
Instead, if we face a convincing artificially-minded
agent,  it  is  characterized by both sophisticated
technological equipment and by our discovery of
principles  of  how the  brain  functions,  such  as
learning or motor control (ibid.; cf. premise  2).
And so, in conclusion, it follows that if biological
understanding and technological equipment come
together, we will be able to build brain-like mod-
els and implement them in highly sophisticated
cognitive agents (ibid.). 
The incautious reader would now have to
believe  that  Eliasmith  is  confusing  necessary
and sufficient conditions. Let us look at this as-
sumed argument in some more detail.  Formu-
lated as a complete argument we would get: “If
it is not the case that technological equipment
alone leads to the building of brain-like models
for  artificial  cognitive  agents,  but  we  face  a
good artificial minded agent which is endowed
with certain technology as well  as biologically
inspired  hardware,  we  have  to  conclude  that
this certain technology and biologically inspired
hardware are not only necessary, but also suffi-
cient for building brain-like models for artificial
cognitive agents.” 
The  formal  expression  of  this  argument
would be the following:
T: We have developed sophisticated tech-
nological equipment.
B: We have developed biologically-inspired
hardware.
M: We can build brain-like models which
can  be  implemented  in  artificial  cognitive
agents.
¬(T → M)
M → (T & B)
(T & B) → M
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As is obvious from how the argument is
constructed, it is invalid. So, what we can say
at this point is  that the combination of both
technical features and biologically-inspired neur-
omorphic hardware very likely does get us some
way, but we might have to consider which ele-
ments  are  missing  so  that  we  really  end  up
building what will be perceived as minds. I shall
propose some possibilities in the following sec-
tion. The author even supposes that we will be
able to build artificial agents ready to rival hu-
mans in cognitive ability (Eliasmith this collec-
tion, p. 9). I am convinced that it is not cognit-
ive  artificial  agents  that  will  be  the  crucial
hurdle, but rather their mindedness. I am also
convinced that the huge amount of money spent
on certain research projects will most likely res-
ult in improved models of the brain, as sugges-
ted by Eliasmith (ibid., p. 8), but it is not obvi-
ous  to  me  how  investing  a  vast  amount  of
money necessarily results in relevant findings. It
is  also  possible  that  no  real  progress  will  be
made.  Stating  the  opposite,  which  Eliasmith
does not, resembles a claim based on expertise
as bulletproof evidence. Sure enough, monetary
sources are needed to make progress, but they
are no guarantee. So possibly technology, biolo-
gical  theories  on  the  brain’s  functioning,  and
money, essentially, might not lead to sophistic-
ated  cognitive  agents  being  built  (ibid.).  The
point is not that we should not invest money
unless a positive outcome is guaranteed. Rather,
we need a theoretical criterion for mindedness
that is philosophically convincing—and not only
robust, but epistemically unjustified social hal-
lucinations. This theoretical criterion is what we
lack.
4 What could artificial minds be?
In this section, I intend to sketch some import-
ant issues and questions for the future debate
on artificial minds. I shall examine whether pre-
dictions on the concept of  artificial minds can
be made at the present state of the debate and
based on the empirical data we currently have.
This involves knowledge about what a mind is,
and knowledge about how an artificial mind is
characterized. In reconstructing Eliasmith’s un-
derstanding of what a mind is, we may find the
following statement informative: he relies on be-
havioral, theoretical, and similarity-based meth-
ods (this collection, p. 3). The possible problem
with this approach is that the characterization
of the methods is very limited. To point to some
relevant  questions:  what  is  the  behavior  of  a
mind? What about the fact that  mind is  not
even close to being well  understood theoretic-
ally?  How  do  similarity-based  methods  avoid
drawing problematic conclusions from analogies
(cf.  Wild 2012)? Importantly, at this point we
are  only  talking  about  natural,  biologically-
grounded minds. Answers as to what an artifi-
cial mind is supposed to be might exceed the
concept of mind in ways we are unable to tell at
the present moment. 
Let us see how Eliasmith characterizes ar-
tificial  minds. One can see this as a judgment
based on the similarity of behavior originating
from two types of agents: humans and artificial.
Functions need to be developed that are neces-
sary for building an artificial mind. These func-
tions lead to a certain kind of behavior.  This
behavior is achieved by perceptive, motor, and
cognitive skills, which are needed to make the
behavior seem human-like. Thus, the functions
implemented on sophisticated kinds of techno-
logy will, in the end, lead to human-like beha-
vior (Eliasmith this collection, p. 9). The reason
why  the  argumentative  step  from  cognition,
perception, and motor skills to mindedness can
be made is the underlying assumption that the
behavior  resulting  from  these  three  types  of
skills is  convincing behavior in our eyes (Elia-
smith this  collection,  p.  10).  Similarity  judg-
ments,  so  Eliasmith  argues,  might  appear
“hand-wavy”. Still, he uses them to reduce the
complexity  that  mindedness  brings  with  it
(ibid.,  pp.  5–6),  and he  certainly  succeeds  in
drawing attention to a whole range of important
issues. However, it could well be that the reduc-
tion to human-like behavior as the benchmark
for assessing mindedness is too simple. After all,
analytical behaviorism today counts as a failed
philosophical research program. There could be
much more  to mindedness  than behavior.  We
just do not know what this is yet. As a possible
candidate  we  might  consider  the  previously
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mentioned  psychological  make-up  of  artificial
agents,  such  as  their  being  endowed with  in-
ternal states like ours. One might think of ro-
bust  first-person  perspectives,  but  also  about
emotions like pain, disappointment, happiness,
fear, and the ability to react to these. Other op-
tions  include  interoceptive  awareness  or  the
ability to interact socially—and much more.
5 What should we brace ourselves for?
Given  the  complexity  of  mindedness  and  our
very limited understanding of what constitutes
it, what else can we talk about? We could con-
sider  further  possibilities  of  artificial  systems
that  might  arise,  thereby  enlarging  the  set  of
constraints  that  has  to  be  satisfied.  Some  of
them  seem  much  more  likely  than  artificial
minds, and they might precede minds chronolo-
gically. I would like to focus on the idea of frag-
mented minds on the one hand and of postbiotic
systems on the other, as two versions of artificial
systems.  An  artificially-constructed  fragmented
mind is characterized by only partial satisfaction
of the constraints fulfilled by a human mind. It
could thus, very much like autistic persons with
savant syndrome (i.e., more than average com-
petence in a certain domain, e.g., language learn-
ing or music), and possess only some of our cog-
nitive functions, but be strikingly better at them
than  normal  humans  are  and  ever  could  be,
given  their  biological  endowment.1 Postbiotic
minds,  on  the  other  hand,  could  satisfy  addi-
tional  constraints  that  are  not  yet  apparent
presently. I will conclude with some reflections
on the new kind of ethics that will have to be
created in order to approach new kinds of cog-
nitive agents.  As pointed out above,  I  assume
that  cognitive  agents  will  be  possible  much
earlier than truly minded agents. Learning, re-
membering,  and  other  cognitive  functions  can
already  be  recreated  in  artificial  systems  like
Spaun.  Still,  human cognition is  very versatile
and complex. A fully minded agent, in contrast
to a merely cognitive agent, might also be able
to experience herself as a cognitive agent.
1 In that case, the variable B from above (biologically inspired hard-
ware) would not be a necessary condition for finding out more about
mindedness.
Therefore,  I  propose  that  cognitive  sys-
tems could be created that do not yet qualify as
a  copy  of  our  cognitive  facilities,  but  which
cover only parts of our cognitive setup. I call
these  fragmented minds. Importantly, the word
minds does not refer here to the artificiality of
the system at all. There are human beings with
fragmented minds, too, such as babies, who do
not yet display the cognitive abilities we ascribe
to adult  humans in general,  or the aforemen-
tioned autistic  humans with savant syndrome.
Fragmented minds are contrasted with what we
experience as normal human minds. Fragmented
means that  the created system possesses  only
part of the abilities that our mind displays. The
term  mind delineates  the—historically  contin-
gent—point of reference that is human beings.
How  are  fragmented  minds  further  character-
ized? Eliasmith himself gives us an example: we
could design a robot (an artificial  mind) that
gains fulfillment from serving humans (this col-
lection, p. 11). This would only be possible if
aspects of our own minds were not part of the
mental  landscape  of  this  robot.  We  could
roughly formulate such an aspect, such as the
will  to design one’s  own life.  Folk psychology
would most likely regard this robot as lacking a
free will, which is in conformity with the idea of
slavery that Eliasmith acknowledges (ibid.). So
a fragmented mind is an artificial system that
possesses part of a biological cognitive system’s
abilities  instead  of  the  rich  landscape  most
higher animals (e.g., some fishes and birds, cer-
tainly mammals), as well as humans, display.
Related  to  the  aspect  of  fragmented
minds is the idea that we could refrain from
creating minds  that  might  cause us a lot  of
moral and practical trouble, and instead focus
on  building  sophisticated  robots  designed  to
carry out specific kinds of tasks. Why do we
need to  create  artificial  minds? What  is  the
additional  value  gained?  If  these  robots  are
not mindful, we will circumvent the vast ma-
jority of conceptual and ethical problems, such
as legal questions (What is their legal status
compared to  ours?)  or  ethical  considerations
(If I am not sure whether an artificial agent
can perceive pain, how should I treat it in or-
der to not cause harm?). In which case, they
Hill, D. (2015). Future Games - A Commentary on Chris Eliasmith.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 12(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570610 6 | 8
www.open-mind.net
would only be more capable technology than
what we know at present, and most likely be
of  no  major  concern  for  the  philosophy  of
mind. However, if they are mindful, we doubt-
lessly  have  to  think  about  new ways  of  ap-
proaching them ethically.
Also  ethically  relevant  are  intermediate
systems,  systems  that  are  not  clearly  either
natural or artificial. These systems have been
called  postbiotic  systems (Metzinger 2012,  p.
268). What characterizes postbiotic systems is
the fact that they are made up of both natural
and artificial  parts,  thus belonging to neither
of the exhaustive categories “natural” or “arti-
ficial”. In that way a natural system, e.g., an
animal, could be controlled by artificially-con-
structed hardware (as in hybrid bio-robotics);
or,  in  the  opposite  case,  artificial  hardware
could  be  equipped  with  biologically-inspired
software, which works in very much the same
way as neuronal computation (Metzinger 2012,
pp.  268–270;  Metzinger 2013,  p.  4).  Perhaps
Eliasmith’s  own  brain-like  model  Spaun is  a
postbiotic  system in this  sense,  too.  In what
way would these systems become ethically rel-
evant? Although the postbiotic systems in ex-
istence today do not have the ability to sub-
jectively experience themselves and the world
around them, they might have it in the future.
In being able to subjectively experience their
surroundings,  they  are  probably  also  able  to
experience  the  state  of  suffering  (Metzinger
2013,  p.  4).  Everything  that  is  able  to  con-
sciously experience a frustration of preferences
as a frustration of its own preferences automat-
ically becomes an object of ethical considera-
tion,  according  to  this  principle.  For  such
cases, we have to think of ethical guidelines be-
fore we are confronted with a suffering postbi-
otic mind, which could be much earlier than we
expect.  Before  thinking  about  how to  imple-
ment something as complex and unpredictable
as an artificial mind, one should consider what
one does not want to generate. This could, for
example, be the ability to suffer, the inability
to judge and act according to ethical premises,
or the possibility of developing itself further in
a way that is  not controllable by and poten-
tially dangerous for humans.
6 Conclusion
In this  commentary, I  have played the “argu-
mentation  game“  as  my own version  of  Elia-
smith’s  “future  game”.  The  intention  behind
this  was  to  demonstrate  that  we  very  likely
need  more  than  sophisticated  technology  and
biologically-inspired  hardware  to  build  brain-
like models ready to be applied in artificial cog-
nitive  agents.  As  such,  I  playfully  took  Elia-
smith’s considerations on the future of artificial
minds  as  arguments,  and  demonstrated  that
they would result in a petitio principii. In so do-
ing, I highlighted that necessary conditions do
not have to be sufficient as well. While this is
common philosophical currency, it is instructive
to spell this out in the case of artificial agents.
So in the present case, what constitutes artifi-
cial  cognitive  systems  and what  is  needed  to
gain a deeper understanding of how the mind
works might include more factors than the two
crucial  ones  Eliasmith  outlines,  namely  biolo-
gical understanding and its implementation in
highly-sophisticated  technology.  I  proposed
some possibilities that might turn out to be in-
formative for future considerations on what con-
stitutes an artificial mind. In particular, I men-
tioned experiential aspects, such as the percep-
tion of emotions and reactions to them, as well
as internal perceptions like interoceptive aware-
ness. In general, this means that we need theor-
etical criteria that are convincing for philosophy
in order to overcome referring to robust yet con-
vincing social  hallucinations.  Further,  to illus-
trate that the distinction between natural and
artificial  systems  might  not  be  exhaustive,  I
pointed to the notions of fragmented minds and
postbiotic systems as possible developments for
the nearer future. They have to be considered,
in particular with respect to their  ethical im-
plications, before they are developed and imple-
mented in practice.
Even though we lack a more fine-grained,
deeper  understanding  of  what  constitutes
minds,  Eliasmith  shows  us  that  it  is  worth
thinking  about  what  we  already  do  have  at
hand  for  constructing  artificially-minded  sys-
tems. He demonstrates vividly that two factors
—technology and biology—are of major import-
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ance on the route to artificially-cognitive, if not
minded, agents. And he brings into discussion a
number  of  far-reaching consequences  that  will
apply in case we do succeed in building artificial
minds within the next five decades. These will
inform the development of these artificial sys-
tems as well as philosophical debate, both on an
ethical, as well as theoretical level. In this way,
Eliasmith’s contribution has to be regarded as
significant in terms of preparing us for the dec-
ades to come. 
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